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I 
Introduction 
Prior to the commencement of the 2012 National Football League (NFL) season, it 
became clear that a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the NFL and the NFL 
Referees Association (NFLRA) was far from being signed. As in various sports, including the 
NFL in 2011, when the NFL struggled with the National Football League Players Association 
(NFLPA), collective bargaining is expected. It creates drama for fans and commentators alike as 
they nervously speculate as to whether there will be a strike or lockout and, if so, when to expect 
the sport to resume. In 2012, when it became obvious that the referees would not have an 
agreement in time, the NFL hired replacement referees to initiate the preseason and eventually, 
they called the first three weeks of regular season games. During these weeks, the replacements 
referees were berated by spectators, including NFL executives, for the calls that were missed, 
ignored, or made improperly. 
While fans complained fruitlessly, DeMaurice Smith, the NFLPA Executive Director, 
also recognized the larger issue that the replacement referees posed: player safety .1 Looking past 
inaccuracies that affected only teams' records, Smith focused on the inadequacy of calls that left 
players vulnerable to injury.2 Smith threatened a league wide player strike until the NFL and 
NFLRA reached a CBA and the referees were back.3 However, what commentators noticed was 
that the threat seemed hollow due to the apparent inability of the players to strike under their 
own collective bargaining agreement.4 
1 Simon Samano, DeMaurice Smith doesn't rule out strike over referee lockout, USA TODAY, (Aug. 29, 20 12), 
http:/ /content. usatoday.com/ communities/thehuddle/post/20 12/08/demaurice-smith-nfl-strike-replacement-
refs/l#.UQQIVuivwhl. 
2 ld 
3 ld 
4 Alicia Jessop, Take The Field: Why the NFLPA Cannot Strike Over Replacement Referees, FORBES, (Aug. 29, 
20 12), http://www .forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/20 12/08/29/take-the-field-why-the-nflpa-cannot-strike-over-
replacement-referees/. 
1 
The CBA agreed to by the NFLPA and the NFL in 2011 explicitly includes a "No Strike" 
Provision.5 In this, excluding a Union Security exception, any "strike, work stoppage, or other 
concerted action interfering with the operations of the NFL" is impermissible.6 Thus Smith's 
threat of a strike immediately seemed to trigger a violation of the NFLPA's collective bargaining 
agreement. 
However, §143 of the National Labor Relations Act, added by the Labor-Management 
Relations Act in 194 7/ designates a specific instance during which a work stoppage is not 
considered a strike. 8 Under this section, an employee may refuse work, in good faith, if he 
perceives an abnormally dangerous condition exists in the work environment.9 Assuming this 
law is applicable, the NFLP A would have had to establish that the replacement referees 
constituted an abnormally dangerous condition for the players in order for a strike to be 
permissible under their collective bargaining agreement. Ultimately, whether or not an 
abnormally dangerous condition exists turns on the interpretation of this law under existing 
precedent. If established, a strike would have been a permissible option for the players during the 
time the replacement referees were used. 
Part I of this Note will offer a detailed analysis of the NFL's response to injury, such as 
rnle alterations to adjust to game changes to protect players. It will also explore the NFL' s 
broader response to injury in the game. Using the past behavior of the League, and the 
seriousness with which it takes injury, the section will also analyze of the replacement referees' 
fitness for their positions. Part II will consider the development in the relevant rnles of law 
regarding work stoppages. Finally, Part III will apply the facts in the NFLPA's situation to the 
5 NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. 3 §I, August 4, 20 II. 
6 Id at Art. 3 §I; ld at Art. 47 §I, §6. 
7 61 Stat. 162 (June 23, 1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §143 (West 2012)). 
8 29 U.S.C.A. §143 (West 2012). 
9 !d. 
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standards that have been developed regarding work stoppage in the presence of a "No Strike" 
provision. 
I. NFL Injury History 
Most recently, the NFL has not taken the seriousness of potential injury lightly, 
specifically with regard to hits that have tendencies to produce concussions. With this in mind, 
the NFL rules are often altered to adopt safety precautions. As early as 1962 the NFL 
implemented a rule prohibiting grabbing a player's facemask. 10 For the next 15 years, sporadic 
rules were implemented to accommodate safety until player protection became a predominant 
interest of rule makers in 1979.11 This was further emphasized in 1980 with the implementation 
of the personal foul rule that prohibited "striking, swinging, or clubbing on the head, neck or 
face."12 The progress of player safety concerns continued and, in 1996, helmet-to-helmet contact 
was designated a personal foul. 13 However, before the interests of the NFL changed and this rule 
was officially implemented, the NFL "turned a blind eye" to the behavior while coaches 
encouraged it. 14 Yet, collectively, these rule changes testify to the NFL's intention to avoid 
injuries as it acknowledged that particular contact, specifically head to head contact, does cause 
serious, preventable injury _IS 
10 History of the NFL Rules, SPORTSATTIC.COM, http://www.sportsattic.com/araig/NflRulesHistory.htm (last visited 
Nov. I, 20 12). 
11 Id (In 1977, the rules implemented to lessen injuries included: outlawing the head slap, prohibition of offensive 
linemen thrusting their hands at an opponent's neck, face, or head, prohibition of wide receivers clipping, and 
defenders only being permitted to make contact with eligible receivers once.); See also Jennifer Ann Heiner, 
Concussions in the National Football League: Jani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan and a Legal 
Analysis of the NFL 's 2007 Concussion Management Guidelines, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 255, 271 
(2008) ("In 1979, the NFL adopted major changes to increase player safety. The rules prohibited players from 
blocking below the waist during kickoff and punt returns, and prevented the players from wearing damaged 
equipment that could be potentially hazardous. Officials were also to call a player dead when the quarterback was in 
the potentially dangerous grasp of a defensive tackler."). 
12 SPORTSATTIC.COM, supra note 10; Heiner, supra note I I at 271. 
13 SPORTSATTIC.COM, supra note I 0; Heiner, supra note I I at 271. 
14 Jeremy P. Gove, Three and Out: The NFL 's Concussion Liability and How Players Can Tackle the Problem, 14 
V AND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 649, 657 (2012). 
15 Id. 
3 
Superficial injuries such as broken bones or tom muscles, whether or not they are career 
ending, do not compare to the side effects of multiple concussions. A concussion, though 
frequently regarded as a bruise to the brain from collision with a hard surface, can in fact happen 
without any collision at all and often will produce little to no swelling or bleeding in a 
radiological scan. 16 A concussion is common when "the head either accelerates rapidly and then 
is stopped, or is spun rapidly."17 Without direct collision, what the brain is actually being 
"stopped" by is the skull and with that, no helmet can truly protect a player. 18 What does protect 
players are the rules implemented by the NFL to prevent concussions and the referees that are 
trained to enforce these rules. 
Additionally of concern is that, according to neurologists, after one concussion, 
individuals are up to four times more likely to suffer another-and with each successive 
concussion, the required force to sustain a future concussion decreases. 19 In a 2000 study of 
former NFL players, it was found that "60 percent had suffered at least one concussion in their 
careers and 26 percent had had three or more."20 The individuals who had reported concussions 
also reported symptoms of memory, concentration, and neurological problems far more than 
those who had never suffered from a concussion.21 In 2009, another study revealed that 
symptoms of Alzheimer's disease and other memory-related illnesses occur in the NFL's former 
players "vastly more often" than in the general population.22 And in 2007, a study found that 
retired NFL players who had sustained three or more concussions during their careers were three 
16 Head lrifuries in Football, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/footba11/head_injuries/index.htm1. 
17 Id 
18 Kevin Cook, Dying to Play, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/opinion/head-injuries-in-football.htm1. 
19 THE NEW YORK TIMES, supra note 16. 
zo Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
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times more likely to have clinical depression. 23 These conditions, clearly the result of brain 
injury, have manifested themselves repeatedly in former NFL players.24 The result of these 
studies led the NFL to announce in 2009 the imposition of its most "stringent rules to date on 
managing concussions," about which awareness was heightened the following year after several 
concussions, inside the NFL and out, became popular concern. 25 The injuries across the sport 
have led to the designation that, "football has become the site of perhaps the gravest health crisis 
in the history of sports."26 
Many spectators, sports analysts and physicians alike have commented on player injuries 
sustained during NFL games. Naturally, these statements increase in seriousness as the injury 
being discussed increases in severity. Dr. James Kelly, of the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago, 
has noted, 
Shots to the head must be outlawed and penalized with suspension, and even 
expulsion, from the sport. The seriousness of concussion needs to be addressed 
with serious consequences for those who inflict them. As we see, a career can be 
ended by concussion. So should the career of habitual head injury perpetrators.27 
As Director of the Brain Injury program, Dr. Kelly is an expert in the matter at hand. 28 Dr. Kelly 
is not alone in his harsh opinion of rule violators that are prone to cause injury. The NFL itself 
takes a similar, albeit diluted stance. Today, penalties for personal fouls are punishable by 15 
23 Id 
24 Id; See also Cook, supra note 18 ("John Mackey, the pioneering president of the N.F.L. 's Players' Association, 
was found to have frontal temporal dementia in his early 60's. Former Bears safety Dave Duerson was 50 years old 
when he committed suicide, shooting himself in the chest so that his brain could be studied. (It showed signs of 
C.T.E.) Junior Seau, a 12-time Pro Bowler for the Chargers, was 43 when he shot himself in the chest last spring."). 
25 Head Injuries in Football, THE NEW YORK TIMES, supra note 16 ("In October 2010 [a] helmet-first collision 
caused the paralysis of a Rutgers University player."). 
26 Lmvyers refer to concussions in NFL as 'gravest health crisis in history of sports'; Football There are more than 
5,000 individuals suing the National Football League, THE TELEGRAPH-JOURNAL, Nov. I, 2012, at B6. 
27 Alexander N. Hecht, Article, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Sports-Related Concussions: The Merril Hoge Story, 
12 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 17, 60 (2002). 
28 Id; See also Brain Injury Rehabilitation Services, REHABILITATION INSTITUTE OF CHICAGO, 
http://www.ric.org/conditionslbrain/services/ (Last visited Mar. 18, 2013)(The Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago's 
Brain Injury Program is both part of a teaching and a research institution with specialties in concussions as well as 
other traumatic brain injury.). 
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yards, with the potential addition of a fine ifthe hit is severe enough.29 Additionally, NFL 
Commissioner Roger Goodell has implemented player suspensions for unnecessary roughness in 
the NFL's quest to limit and discipline potential injury-causing conduct.30 
As players' salaries have grown to seven figures, their longevity has also become a larger 
concern for the league.31 Even in 1995, then Buffalo Bills coach, Marv Levy, remarked, "The 
Competition Committee [of the NFL] [is] consistently making a concerted effort to help protect 
players from injury."32 According to Commissioner Goodell in the NFL's 2012 Health and 
Safety Report, in addition to the longevity of players' careers, the NFL has an explicit interest in 
ensuring that players are safe to pursue their goals off of the field?3 In keeping with this interest, 
the NFL has already invested $22 million in funding to research and improve player safety with 
an additional $100 million to be invested within the next ten years.34 Of this $100 million, $30 
million has already been granted to the Foundation for the National Institute of Health-making 
it the largest donation in the history of the league. 35 The amount of capital being invested in the 
safety of players reflects the NFL' s concerns with the rate of injury in the league. And perhaps it 
is in fact genuinely concerned, considering that rule changes are implemented despite harsh 
reactions from fans and players alike who view attempts to limit contact to be destructive of the 
game.36 
29 Linda S. Calvert Hanson & Craig Demis, Revisiting Excessive Violence in the Professional Sports Arena: 
Changes in the Past Twenty Years? 6 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 127, !59 (1996). 
30 Ray Fittipaldo, Players question NFL 's call on stand-in referees, PiTTSBURGH POST -GAZETTE, (Sept. 26, 20 12), 
http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/sports/steelers/players-question-nfls-call-on-stand-in-referees-654908/. 
31 Hanson & Demis, supra note 29 at 159. 
32 Id at 160. 
33 Roger Goodell, Forewarcl, NFL FALL2012 HEALTH & SAFETY REPORT, 2 (2012). 
34 John York, M.D., Welcome to the Fal/2012 NFL Health & Safety Report, NFLFALL2012 HEALTH & SAFETY 
REPORT, 3 (2012). 
35 Id 
36 Chris Chase, NFL players speak out on the NFL 's awfol. new dangerous hit rule, YAHOO! SPORTS BLOG, (Oct. 20, 
2012, I 0:35 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl!hlog/shutdown _ comer/post/NFL-players-speak-out-on-the-NFL-s-
awful-new-da?um~nfl-278498. 
6 
However, without implementation by coordinated, trained, and prepared referees, these 
rule changes are likely to be ineffective. The referee corps that the NFL regards so highly is the 
only force standing between the rules on paper and the rules in play. According to the NFL, 
referee applicants must have a minimum of ten years of officiating experience, five of which 
must be conducted on a collegiate or professional field. 37 Yet, for all intents and purposes, it 
appears that the group of2012 replacements barely meets the lowest requirements. Allegedly, 
this group consists of some college officials, none of whom had any experience in Division 1 
football, one former Lingerie Football League (LFL) official who was released by the LFL for 
incompetence, and even some who had only officiated "glorified high school games. "38 
Regardless of whether the League had successfully collected the most qualified group of 
available substitute referees willing to officiate, the NFL' s support of these replacements led to 
much secrecy regarding their resumes. 39 Although the NFL defended the credentials of its 
replacements, its credibility suffered as information surfaced. 40 In August 2012, as the preseason 
opened and rumors began to spread, specifically regarding official Craig Ochoa and the Lingerie 
Football League, the NFL immediately denied that he had been let go from his previous position 
with the LFL.4 I However, in September 2012, LFL commissioner, Mitch Mortaza, came forward 
37 How to Become an Official, http://www.nfl.com/help/faq (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
38 Rose Eveleth, What's the Deal With The NFL 's Replacement Referees?, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE BLOG (Sept. 17, 
2012, 9:44 AM), http:/ /blogs.smithsonianmag.com/ smartnews/20 12/09/whats-the-deal-with-the-nfls-replacement-
referees/; Houston Mitchell, NFL referees: Lingerie Football League says NFL is using refit fired, Los ANGELES 
TIMES, (Sept. 26, 20 12), http://articles.latimes.com/print/20 12/sep/26/sports/la-sp-sn-lingerie-football-league-
20120926; Sam Borden, With Referees Out, N.F.L. Stars Throw Flag on Novice Fill-Ins, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 27, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/sports/footballlcalls-by-some-nfl-replacement-referees-raise-
concerns.html. 
39 Former NFL Chief Referee: NFL Is Lying About The Experience of Replacement Reft, CBS CHICAGO, (Aug. 7, 
20 12), http ://chicago.cbslocal.com/20 12/08/07/pereira-replacement -refs-will-only-hurt-the-nfll. (Division 1 Referees 
are unlikely to participate as replacement referees for several reasons, including ( 1) they know the position is 
temporary and (2) taking the position could impede their ability to receive a full time NFL position in the future.). 
40 Mike Florio, League counters Pereira's claim of embellished credentials, NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK, 
(Aug. 7, 20 12), http ://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/20 12/08/07 /league-counters-pereiras-claim-of-embellished-
credentials/. 
41 /d. 
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expressing his "shock to see guys that couldn't officiate in [the LFL] were officiating in the 
NFL."42 Not only did Mortaza confirm Ochoa had in fact been let go, but he alluded also to 
reasons such as missed calls and poor judgment that "opened up [LFL] players for potential 
injury."43 If true, these inadequacies have obvious implications. However, without actual proof 
of employment and termination for any of the replacements, it becomes impossible to draw the 
line between truth and embellishment. 
In addition to concerns for basic qualification, the replacement referees were unprepared 
to initiate a professional football season without on-field guidance from veteran officials. Under 
normal circumstance, a referee would come into the NFL and have the opportunity to gain 
experience while observing and interacting with those who had already acclimated.44 In a typical 
season, no more than one rookie referee is assigned to an officiating crew. 45 As Jim Tunney, a 
retired official with 31 years of NFL experience, stated, "When I started, I had only a few years 
in Division I, but I had a lot of other officials around me who could help me. Who are these guys 
going to ask?"46 Replacement referee, Jerry Frump, admitted that the replacements, as a group, 
were not ready for the challenge ahead of them because they "didn't have [the] experience."47 
The replacements came into the season without the luxury of being able to rely on their more 
experienced co-officials. Thus, mistakes were overlooked, ignored, or unnoticed. Even the booth 
42 Borden, supra note 38. ("For a number of reasons, high-level college officials are reluctant to moonlight in the 
N.F.L. as replacements. They do not want to appear disloyal to their college conference supervisors ... or jeopardize 
their current positions with little chance of remaining in the pros after the labor issue is settled."); Houston Mitchell, 
NFL referees: Lingerie Football League says NFL is using refit fired, Los ANGELES TIMES, (Sept. 26, 2012), 
http:/ /artic1es.latirnes.cornlprint/20 12/sep/26/sports/la-sp-sn-lingerie-football-league-20 120926. 
43 Mitchell, supra note 42. 
44 Craig Wolf, So you want to be an NFL referee? As the replacement officials showed, it's not easy, NJ.COM, (Sept. 
30, 20 12), http://www.nj.com/giants/index.ss£120 12/09/so _you_ want_ to_ be_ an _nfl _refer.html#. 
45 Id 
46 Borden, supra note 38. 
47 Sean Gregory, I Was a Replacement Ref Inside the NFL 's 7 Weirdest Weeks, TIME SPORTS BLOG, (Sept. 28, 
20 12), http:/ /keepingscore. blogs.time.com/20 12/09/28/a-replacement-ref-reflects-did-the-nfl-overlook-an-obvious-
experience-gap/. 
8 
review that had been extended to acconnnodate replacement referees was oflittle assistance.48 
Instead of the on-field officials controlling close plays, a booth reviewer had the responsibility of 
judging whether calls were close enough to warrant a second look. This additional review also 
allowed for consultation with a rule interpreter; however the system continued to fail to make 
appropriate calls despite these safety nets.49 
One of the few individuals supporting the replacements was cornerback Cortland 
Finnegan. 5° However, admiration from someone known for "[aspiring] to be the dirtiest player in 
the league," is not positive support when his intention is to commend the replacements for not 
appropriately enforcing the rules. 51 With the reputation ofreplacements known to players, such 
as Finnegan, there is a greater risk that their inexperience would be taken advantage of, leading 
to an increase in injuries. 52 If the NFL were as concerned with player safety as its public 
statements warrant, an environment where players were more susceptible to injury should have 
been actively avoided. 
II. NLRA §143: History & Requirements 
29 U.S.C.A. §143 is applicable to employees operating under an employment contract or 
collective bargaining agreement that contains a no strike provision, either expressly or 
impliedly. 53 "[T]he quitting oflabor by an employee or employees in good faith because of 
abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or 
48 Dan Levy, Horrible NFL Replacement Officials May Be Good for the League Long Term, BLEACHER REPORT, 
(Sept. 18, 20 12), http://b leacherreport.com/articles/133 8578-nfl-horrible-replacement-officials-may-be-good-for-
the-leagne-long-term. 
•• Id 
50 Michael David Smith, Cortland Finnegan likes replacements: "They let you play football, "NBC SPORTS: 
PROFOOTBALLTALK, (Sept. !9, 2012, 4:40 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/20 12/09/19/cortland-finnegan-
likes-replacements-they-let-you-play-football/. 
51 Id 
52 Benjamin Hoffman, Criticism ofNF.L. Replacement Officials Builds, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. !8, 2012), 
http://www .nytimes.com/20 12/09/19/sports/football/criticism-of-nfl-replacement-officials-builds.html. 
53 TNS, Inc. (TNS I), 309 NLRB !348, 1451 (N.L.R.B. 1992); TNS, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (TNS II), 296 F.3d 384, 390 
(6th Cir. 2002). 
9 
employees [shall not] be deemed a strike."54 Upon a finding of applicability of§ 143, it is 
necessary to apply a relevant four-part test that has been established for dangers in the 
workplace. 55 The test provides that, for a claim to be successful, based on a preponderance of the 
evidence, (I) employees must have believed in good faith that an abnormally dangerous 
condition existed in their workplace; (2) this belief must have caused the strike; (3) the belief 
must be supported by objective, ascertainable evidence; and ( 4) the dangerous condition must 
have posed an immediate risk of harm. 56 
Unfortunately, there is no clear definition of "abnormally dangerous."57 Thus, 
establishing this condition is determined on a case-by-case basis and left to the National Labor 
Relations Board. 58 Under these circumstances, courts have relied on a working definition of 
"abnormal," which conveys a condition that is "deviating from the normal. .. or average."59 
Football is an inherently dangerous sport. For the replacement referees to constitute an 
abnormally dangerous condition, they must have created additional elements of danger that were 
not previously present on a regular basis. 
The conditions of good faith and causation here can be treated as givens. NFL players 
have an explicit interest in preserving their own safety. Thus, there was little motive to be 
dishonest with the NFL in expressing their intent to do so.60 The circumstances surrounding the 
potential2012 strike did not support the belief that the players may have had an ulterior motive. 
In the past, ulterior motives have been noted at times when an abnormally dangerous work 
54 29 U.S.C.A. §143 (West 2012). 
55 TNS II, 296 F.3d at 389. 
56 Id at 389 (Emphasis added). 
57 TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1357. 
58 ld 
59 John B. Flood, Revisiting The Right To RefUse Hazardous Work Amidst The Anthrax Crisis o/2001, 5 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 545, 564 (2003). 
60 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 762 (9th ed. 2009). 
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condition surfaced "coincidentally" at the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. 61 In 
the immediate case, the NFLP A entered a collective bargaining agreement with NFL only one-
year prior. 62 Therefore, the Player's Association was not focusing on the issue of safety to 
disguise its underlying economic interest. Following the assumption of good faith, the strike 
discussed by the NFL Player's Association indicated no purpose other than the concern of safety, 
nor can a valid assumption be made that one existed. 63 Thus, what must be analyzed are the 
requirements of objective and ascertainable evidence, and what constitutes an immediate risk of 
harm. 
a. Objective & Ascertainable Evidence 
No matter how honest a belief in danger may be, if it is unreasonable or cannot be 
substantiated by objective evidence, it will not be upheld.64 However, the issue remains as to 
what will constitute objective and ascertainable evidence. 
The test to determine if evidence is objective is whether a reasonable person might also 
consider the condition abnormally dangerous. 65 Employees in similar fields would likely share 
the same opinion as the employee(s) in question as to whether hazards in the work environment 
were unsafe. 66 As for form, this evidence can be ascertained through opinion testimony of an 
employee as to the conditions that he or she observed. 67 Thus, the evidence presented must meet 
61 TNS II, 296 F.3d at 395. 
62 NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, August 4, 20 II. 
63 See Fittipaldo, supra note 30. 
64 Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 386 (1974); See also TNS I, 309 NLRB at 
1357 ("What controls is not the state of mind of the employee or employees concerned, but whether the actual 
working conditions shown to exist by competent evidence might in the circumstances reasonably be considered 
'abnormally dangerous."'); See also TNS II, 296 F.3d at 392 ("[T]his circuit has held that the important question ... 
is not whether abnormal danger actually existed, but whether it was shown by objective evidence that employees' 
working conditions 'might reasonably be considered 'abnormally dangerous.'"'). 
65 TNS II, 296 F.3d at 392. 
66 !d. 
67 Nat' I Labor Relations Bd. v. Knight Morley, 251 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1957) ("Laymen may testifY as to 
physical conditions which they themselves have observed.") 
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the reasonable person standard, and must be objective enough as to allow the fact finder to 
identity the facts. 
b. Immediate Risk of Harm 
In establishing a claim under NLRA § 143, it is not necessary to prove that the conditions 
were "in fact'' abnormally dangerous, nor does an employee have to "actually manifest physical 
injury or [be] on the verge of doing so as a result of the conditions. "68 A principal case on the 
matter, TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, states that the failure of a regulatory agency to shut a place of 
business down for health and safety reasons despite its authority to do so does not mean that an 
abnormal danger does not exist. 69 In the instance referred to, the abnormally dangerous condition 
in fact was not the question. 70 The employees' belief of said condition was the predominant 
issue.71 However, while the condition does not have to be proven to in fact exist, there must be a 
"presently existing threat" or "immediate danger."72 This does not occur merely because an 
already existing threat in the work place becomes more than the employee cares to handle. 73 
Therefore the relevant test is one of establishing that, based on objective evidence, an inherently 
dangerous condition has "changed significantly for the worse" and now poses "a substantial 
threat of imminent danger."74 
68 TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1356. 
69 TNS 11, 296 F.3d at 398. 
7o Id 
71 Id 
72 Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 385. 
III. Applicability ofNLRA §143 
73 TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1358 ("[W]ork which is recognized and accepted by employees as inherently dangerous does 
not become 'abnormally dangerous' merely because employee patience with prevailing conditions wears thing or 
their forbearance ceases."). 
74 Id at 1357 (In its original form, this test had two parts and was applied to workers that were exposed to 
radioactive and/or toxic substances in the workplace; The test's two parts for proving an abnormally dangerous 
condition were "[E]ither (I) that inherently dangerous conditions in the subject workplace had changed significantly 
for the worse, so as to impose a substantial threat of imminent danger if exposure were continued at the time the 
employees began to withhold their services, or (2) that the cumulative effects of exposure to those substances had 
reached the point at which any further exposure would pose an unacceptable risk of future injury to employees."). 
12 
In the first forty years of the statute's existence, there have been only six instances in 
which abnormally dangerous conditions were actually found. 75 In these six cases, there were 
findings of immediate dangers that were "substantially greater than those presented by normally 
existing conditions" at the employment facility. 76 Thus, in order to successfully assert that 
NLRA § 143 is appropriate for the NFLPA, it would have had to do the same and establish that 
the conditions had changed. As stated, in the immediate circumstance good faith and causation 
need not be questioned. 77 The focus of the analysis is on whether there is ascertainable, objective 
evidence that will support a finding of an abnormally dangerous condition, and whether the 
player employees were at risk of immediate harm because of this condition. 78 
a. Objective & Ascertainable Evidence 
To determine whether there was ascertainable and objective evidence, the NFLP A would 
have had to first look to the standards set forth in prior case law in order to establish its NLRA 
§ 143 claim. Objective evidence is that which will convince a person to reasonably decide that a 
dangerous condition exists.79 Such objective evidence is found when a person in a similar field of 
employment would agree with a statement made regarding the safety of a working condition. 80 
The context that has been described is one in which a truck driver exclaimed that his vehicle was 
not safe to drive, and based on agreement from other drivers, the evidence was "objective 
enough ... to lead a person to reasonably determine that he should not drive such a truck."81 
1. Players' Opinions Submitted as Objective Evidence 
75 Id 
76 Id 
77 See Fittipaldo, supra note 30. 
78 TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1357. 
79 TNS II, 296 F.3d at 392. 
so Id 
si Id 
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With this as a standard for objective evidence, the opinions of all players would have to 
have been evaluated to determine whether they collectively believed a dangerous condition 
existed and whether that condition was substantially different from typical on-field experience. 82 
Although the opinions of players were never collectively compiled, their opinions of the 
replacements were no secret. 83 New York Giants defensive end Mathias Kiwanuka expressed 
that, in reviewing the calls that the replacement referees were missing, "player safety is the big 
issue."84 Defensive lineman Justin Tuck ofthe Giants agreed. 85 He mentioned specifically that he 
witnessed pass interference "at a high rate" that had not been called, as well as holding. 86 Tuck 
stated that, when rules are not followed because the replacements are not making calls, "You get 
guys that (are) getting pulled down and [getting] hamstring (injuries); you get all these different 
types of things that could happen and player safety bec~mes an issue."87 The teanunates agreed 
that, when "you let people get away with stuff, they're going to continue to do it."88 Philadelphia 
Eagles receiver Jason Avant reiterated this sentiment.89 He even went so far as to say, "Guys are 
going to kind of cheat" when they know what the replacements are going to ignore. 90 It is clear 
that, even if some players were not worried about their safety, they knew that the replacement 
referees were creating an environment in which rules were not strictly followed and they saw this 
as an opportunity to be more physical. 91 
82 /d.; TNS I, 309 NLRB at 1357. 
83 Ian Begley, Ex-ref Roger Goodell doesn't care, ESPN, (Sept, 18,2012, 8:19PM), http://espn.go.com/new-
york/nfl/story/jid/8396189/fonner-referee-jerry-markbreit -b lasts-nfl-roger-goodell-use-rep lacement-officials. 
84 /d. 
85 !d. 
86 !d. 
87 /d. 
88 !d. 
89 Replacement officials taking heat, ESPN, (Sept, 18, 2012, 6:27PM), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/ _jid/8394294/nfl-coaches-players-fed-fill-refs 
90 !d. 
91 Smith, supra note 50. 
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In addition to comments that many players and coaches made regarding the replacements, 
others took it into their own hands to reprimand the officials for their inadequacies. Linebacker 
Larry Foote, of the Pittsburgh Steelers, was seen chasing an official off the field to confront 
him-he believed that an uncalled illegal chop block had injured his teammate. 92 Cortland 
Finnegan aside, it is obvious that there was a general concern for the ability of the replacements 
to officiate in a marmer that would protect the safety of players. 
2. Replacement Referee Performance 
What then must be considered is whether these concerns were reasonable or justified 
enough to be considered objective. For this, we can look to what actually happened on the field 
during the reign of the replacement referees. Beyond the errors in marking balls, or the 
inaccuracy in applying the correct amount of yards to a penalty, what solidified the players' 
concern for their safety were the missed calls that led to injury. Unfortunately for the players, as 
well as for the reputation of the replacement referees, injury did in fact happen.93 Fortunately, the 
injury was not serious enough to end the season of its victim, but it did establish the danger 
present on the field. 94 During the last week under the replacement referees, Darrius Heyward-
Bey, Oakland Raiders receiver, was hit with helmet-to-helmet contact in such a way that he 
immediately became unconscious and thereafter suffered a neck strain and concussion. 95 The hit, 
even though it ultimately required Heyward-Bey to be taken from the field on a stretcher, was 
not penalized by the replacements. 96 This was precisely what the NFLP A feared would be caused 
92 Fittipa1do, supra note 30. 
93 Sam R. Quinn, Darrius Heyward-Bey ll!iury: Updates on Raiders WR's Head lnury, BLEACHER REPORT, (Sept. 
23, 20 12), http://b1eacherreport.com/articles/1345172-darrius-heyward-bey-injury-updates-on-raiders-wrs. 
94 Id. 
95 Id 
96 Barry Wilner, Replacement Reft Create Chaos In NFL Week 3, Huffington Post, (Sept. 23, 2012), 
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/20 12/09/23/rep1acement-refs-chaos-nfl-week-3-49ers-challenges _ n _1908131.html. 
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by the inadequacies of the replacement officials. The injury crystallizes the dangerous condition 
that existed on the field under the control of the replacement referees. 
A possible second basis for assessing the adequacy of referees is the rate that the coaches' 
challenges have overturned a call on the field, but this would be without merit. Over the past five 
years, the rate of overturned plays have consistently increased-the highest being a 53% rate of 
plays overturned by coaches' challenges.97 In the 2012 season, for the first time in five years, the 
rate dramatically decreased. With only 31% of plays being overturned through Week 2 of the 
regular season, it may seem easy to conclude that the replacements were making the appropriate 
calls because they were upheld.98 However, this is not the case. The reason for this decrease is 
the booth review, in more than one respect.99 The statistic neither includes the rate that calls were 
overturned when the replay was initiated by the booth-instead ofthe coach-nor does it 
consider that, in a typical NFL game, the referees on the field review the calls that coaches 
challenge, not the booth. 100 Therefore, the booth reviewer in this instance is technically a 
replacement too-at least with respect to the job that he or she is performing when assessing 
coaches' challenges. 101 Additionally, the rate of challenge does not indicate every incorrect or 
missed call. 
Alternatively, the league-generated grades based on a play-by-play of each game should 
be analyzed. 102 In Week I alone, before the replacements had made any significant mistakes and 
97 Kevin Clark, The NFL Replacement Ref Audit, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, (Sept. 19, 2012), 
http:/ /online. wsj .com/article/SB I 0000872396390443 816804578004613 70 1813182.html. 
98 Id 
99 Mike Florio, Replacement ref "audit" misses the point, NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK, (Sept. 21, 2012), 
http:/ /profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/20 12/09/21/replacement -ref-audit -misses-the-point/. 
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before the brunt force of the criticism had been produced, the average officiating errors per game 
exceeded thirty, as opposed to the single digit averages of the regular officials. 103 
Even setting the statistics aside, the NFL admittedly "trained, championed, and cultivated" 
its referee corps in order to enhance safety, and without them, that safety became a prominent 
issue. 104 Players agreed that, with the NFL regarding safety so highly and fining players for 
safety reasons, it was counterintuitive to have officials on the field that were unable to protect the 
safety of players. 105 
3. Reports from Relevant Regulator Agencies 
Additionally, objective evidence has been found in the reports of regulatory agencies 
regarding safety violations in a work place. In the leading case on the matter, TNS, Inc. v. 
NL.R.B., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a prior decision of the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) in which the Board found that, although an abnormally dangerous 
condition may not have existed in fact, the employees provided objective evidence to suggest 
that their belief in the abnormally dangerous condition was reasonable. 1 06 The employees in TNS 
were exposed to depleted uranium in their work place, a radioactive and carcinogenic 
substance. 107 While the employee's were exposed to this daily, the rates of exposure were 
regulated by the appropriate state agency. 108 This regulatory agency cited TNS, Inc. several times 
for health and safety violations; however, nothing came of these citations. 109 The employer did 
103 Id 
104 Matt Brooks, NFL to teams: Replacement referees will work Week 1, 1llE WASHINGTON POST, (Aug. 29, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.comlblogs/early-lead/post/nfl-to-teams-replacement-referees-will-work-week-
l/20 12/08/29/13f9669e-f204-ll e l-a612-3cfc842a6d89 blog.html. 
105 Begley, supra note 83. -
106 TNS II, 296 F.3d at 398. 
107 !d. at 387. 
108 Id at 397. 
109 Id at 398. 
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not completely alleviate the circumstances, nor did the employees immediately strike. 110 
However, when the employer sought to use the employee's continued work as evidence of their 
acceptance of the safety hazards, and even of the absence of an abnormally dangerous condition, 
the NLRB instead justified the employee's ultimate strike. 111 It found that the safety standard 
violations were enough to establish a good faith belief in the dangerous condition. 112 While the 
Sixth Circuit in TNS did not find the evidence provided to be substantial enough to support this 
finding, 113 the Sixth Circuit did decide was that the NLRB does in fact have the ability to find 
objective evidence to support an employee's belief in an abnormally dangerous condition despite 
the inaction of the relevant regulatory agencies. 114 
Thus, in addition to players' reasonable beliefs as objective evidence regarding the safety 
on the field, the NFLP A may also look to comments made by the NFL itself in order to implicate 
the NLRA § 143 exception to the no-strike provision. While a fine imposed on a player is not the 
NFL' s "comment" in a strict sense regarding the replacement referees, the fines certainly send a 
message. This message was obvious after the Week 1 fines were issued, and it clearly stated that, 
despite replacement officials missing penalties, players would be held accountable for their 
illegal actions. 115 Everson Griffin, Minnesota Vikings defensive lineman, was fined $15,750 for 
his only Week I hit. 116 This hit, although ignored by the replacement officials, was one that 
inflicted helmet-to-helmet contact to Jacksonville Jaguars quarterback, Blaine Gabbert.117 The 
NFL, notwithstanding its attempts to circumvent the negative attention already brought upon the 
110 !d. 
111 !d. 
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mId. at 403. 
114 I d. at 400. 
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replacement referees, has acknowledged the officials' inadequacies. 118In fining players for illegal 
activity, the league takes rule interpretation by commentators and transforms it from mere 
speculation. Once the NFL has imposed a fine, it has also conceded that the activity was in fact 
illegal. Therefore, if such activity was not called during a game, it is not a mere implication that 
the referees missed the call-it is a fact. Although the NFL does not use the fine system to clean 
up after officials, as fines are imposed in addition to field penalties, fines were, at times, the only 
retribution for which players had to fear. 
Griffin was not the only player to be fined after a game for a penalty that was not called 
on the field. 119 Golden Tate of the Seattle Seahawks was fined $21,000 for an illegal block 
against Sean Lee of the Dallas Cowboys. 120 Tate used the crown of his helmet to inflict a brutal 
blindside hit on Lee, violating Rule 12 of the Official Playing Rules of the NFL. 121 The hit was 
not penalized on the field, but the NFL recognized it as an oversight by replacement officials. 122 
However, this is precisely the dangerous play that can occur without proper rule 
implementation. 123 The NFL fining for behavior exhibited on the field indicates its concession 
that illegal activity is occurring, and the publicity of the flagless fines only further magnifies the 
NFL's knowledge ofthe replacement referees' failures. 
The fines implemented for illegal activity, typically hits made illegal for safety reasons, 
are comparable to the safety citations in TNS, Inc. 124 The NFL, the ultimate regulatory authority 
lis Id 
119 Michael David Smith, NFL fines Golden Tate $21,000 for block on Sean Lee, NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLT ALK, 
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in the situation, recognized the safety issues by imposing fines for the behavior; however, as an 
employer, it did not do its utmost to alleviate the dangerous situation. 125 As in TNS, Inc., the 
fines may not be enough for the NFLP A to establish that a dangerous working condition in fact 
existed. 126 However, the NFL's failure to take more immediate action when signing a CBA with 
the NFLRA, despite the safety issues posed by the replacements, does not preclude the NFLP A 
from establishing its belief that an abnormally dangerous condition did exist. 127 
4. The NFL's Prior Dedication to Safetv 
The NFL has not concealed its intention to make alterations to the game in order to 
protect the safety of players. DeMaurice Smith, NFLP A Executive Director, has noted, "The 
NFL has chosen to prevent the very officials that they have trained, championed and cultivated 
for decades to be on the field to protect players and-by their own admission-further our goal 
of enhanced safety. That is absurd on its face." 128 During the 2011 season, the NFL initiated 
concussion awareness training for referees, most notably due to San Diego Chargers lineman 
Kris Dielman' s seizure after an undiagnosed and unaddressed concussion. 129 The concussion 
awareness techniques developed in this training, in addition to a firm grasp of the rules, is 
something the replacement referees did not have the opportunity to cultivate. 130 Although they 
were given "concise" concussion training, this information was in addition to the regular rules 
125 Smith, supra note 119. 
126 TNS II, 296 F.3d at 403. 
127 !d. at 400. 
128 Samano, supra note I (Smith notes several points in the safety of the game, "One, the players and the league have 
made tremendous strides in trying to make the game safer over the last three years ... The second fact is, at the 
players' urging, the National Football League last year gave the referees more power to spot and deal with a 
concussed or injured player. The third inescapable fact is, over the last 20 years the league has done everything to 
maintain an experienced referee corps."). 
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training. 131 The overload of information, coupled with inexperience, high intensity on the field, 
and the sheer lack of time allotted to absorb the material, meant the replacements were not 
equipped to apply the condensed version of the training they had been given. 132 
The league has insisted on creating a safer environment for players, yet while it impliedly 
and explicitly acknowledged the deficiency in the replacement staff and continued to prolong the 
CBA negotiations, the safety of players was at risk. For players, there was a vast difference 
between trained, experienced, properly qualified referees and the less competent replacement 
staff. The replacements, through no fault oftheir own, were inherently under-qualified for the 
positions they were given. Because of their inexperience, they put the players at risk by creating 
an abnormally dangerous condition on an already dangerous field. 
b. Immediate Risk of Harm 
In order to fully understand the risk of harm that the players faced, both the causal chain 
leading to and the severity of the potential injury must be considered. As stated by the concerned 
players, the higher risk of injury with the replacement referees was the inefficiency in calling 
fouls. 133 Because calls were being missed, players were more inclined to push the replacements 
in order to see what would and what would not be called. Therefore, they were more physical 
and, in some cases, disregarded or took advantage of rules that were put in place to prevent 
injury. 134 It is true that, if a hit is going to be delivered, whether it is called is irrelevant to the 
risk that injury will occur. However, injuries were likely to stem from the players' conception 
that they could "get away with" illegal behavior, and even further, that it was permissible to try 
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to get away with this behavior. 135 Therefore, although the replacements themselves were not 
directly causing the injury, their lack of control of the game and their reputations among players 
were the proximate cause of a more physical, unnecessarily dangerous game. 
1. Brain Injuries and Their Consequences in Football 
Beyond the repercussions of concussions already discussed, newly being studied is 
Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE). 136 This degenerative brain disease is one that 
produces symptoms similar to Alzheimer's disease, the difference being that CTE has no genetic 
cause. 137 Because repeated brain trauma is the only clear cause of the condition, it is the only 
avoidable form of dementia. 138 While the research is still relatively new, it has been found that 
"any athlete who may have sustained more than one concussive injury may be at risk for 
CTE."139 Unfortunately, at this point in time there is no test to determine whether an individual 
has CTE while he is alive. 140 However, through studying brain tissue after death, of the 51 
confirmed cases of CTE, the condition was found in at least 5 football players. 141 Of the 
confirmed cases, 90 percent of the CTE cases were found in athletes as opposed to the 10 percent 
found in the general population. 142 
While football players accounted for just over 11 percent of the confirmed CTE cases in 
athletes, boxers accounted for just fewer than 87 percent of these cases. 143 Although both sports 
involve a significant amount of contact, the substantial difference can be attributed to the 
regulations of each sport with respect to preventing head injury and concussion. Beyond the rule 
135 See Begley, supra note 83. 
136 Terry Zeigler, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, SPORTS MD, (Feb. l, 2012), 
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prohibiting contact while an opponent is down and the implementation of a mouth guard to 
absorb some of the force to the head, boxing offers little protection to its athletes, especially 
when it comes to head injury. 144 The regulations ofthe sport focus on assessment, diagnosis, and 
treatment rather than prevention. 145 Conversely, the NFL has implemented various rules and 
regulations to protect its players from head injury and ensure their longevity. 146 The League, in 
creating these rules, acknowledged the dangers inherent in the sport and sought to limit the 
potential for occurrence. 147 The Official Playing Rules of the NFL strictly prohibit a player from 
using his helmet to collide with an opponent, especially when colliding with that opponent's 
helmet. 148 However, without the appropriate referees to ensure these rules are actually put into 
action, the regulations become ineffective. The on-field experience begins to mirror that of a 
boxing match-minimum regulation and maximum contact. 
Although broken bones and tom ligaments occur as frequently as head injuries, and 
perhaps call for longer recovery in terms of games missed, concussions were the immediate risk 
that players faced due to the replacement referees. 149 The inefficiency in play calling created an 
environment wherein players' safety was at great risk, more so than the typical risks associated 
with the sport. 150 The NFL implements rules in order to prevent the risk of head injury and 
concussion but the rules are merely words on paper without a referee who is trained and 
experienced enough to enforce them on the field, in real time. 
144 Boxing Rules & Regulations, !SPORT, http://boxing.isport.com/boxing-guides/boxing-rules-regulations (Last 
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IV. Conclusion 
Inexperienced officials will inevitably make mistakes in play calls as they grow 
accustomed to the fast pace and high energy in an NFL game. For this reason, under usual 
circumstances, the NFL places only one rookie referee in each game. 151 The potential for 
mistakes in employing an entire officiating crew of rookie's is limitless. During the reign of the 
replacement referees, calls were missed during every game, some more obvious than others.152 
Even the NFL was compelled to release a statement regarding the missed offensive pass 
interference call in the Green Bay v. Seattle game that resulted in a Seattle touchdown and cost 
Green Bay the game. 153 While the "W" was stolen from the Packers, the NFL chose not to alter 
the record of either team because, without the pass interference call, a lack of which was not 
reviewable, the elements of the play that were reviewable would not overturn the touchdown. 154 
Even amid campaigning, President Obama and Vice Presidential Candidate Paul Ryan took to 
the media to comment on the performance of the replacement officials after this particularly 
unfortunate display. 155 
The presence of the replacement officials created an abnormally dangerous condition that 
put the safety of players at risk of immediate harm. As stated, in order to successfully strike due 
to this condition, despite the NFLPA and NFL's CBA, the NFLPA would have had to establish 
that (1) players believed in good faith that an abnormally dangerous condition existed on the 
field; (2) this belief must have caused the strike; (3) the belief must have been supported by 
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objective, ascertainable evidence; and ( 4) the dangerous condition must have posed an 
immediate risk ofharm. 156 The actions of the replacement referees established their under 
qualification through their inability to perform the necessary tasks of officiating and enforcing 
the NFL rules that prevent injury and protect safety. All players seem to agree-the rules were 
not being followed because infractions were not being acknowledged. 157 This lack of discipline 
and enforcement made for a dangerous field environment where players could not expect the 
protection afforded by the rules. 158 Thus, an already dangerous game was transformed and the 
standard risks became substantially greater in all respects. However, most relevantly, the 
immediate risk of head injury expanded gravely. As in any other circumstance where an 
individual in a position of power is replaced, individuals will be inclined to see what they can get 
away with. In this situation, players were aware ofthe officials' inadequacies and were able to 
push the limits with certain rules. In doing so, their opponents were put in a preventable position 
of danger. 
The NFLP A would be able to establish that the replacement referees constituted an 
abnormally dangerous condition within the NFL that put the players' safety at immediate risk of 
harm. They therefore would have been able to successfully strike, despite the "No Strike" 
provision of their collective bargaining agreement. 
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